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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 130 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 07/02/1998 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
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An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for six years. He was working on land described as "grazing 
land" [in Afghanistan this means "rocky hills"].  
The investigators determined that the deminer was resting while his partner worked when he 
saw a fuse in the uncleared area at the side of the lane. He picked it up and "started playing" 
with it and it exploded. The Section Leader was covering for another deminer who had gone 
to urinate [so was not observing]. 
The victim stated he was collecting fragments that remained in the cleared area/breaching 
lane and picked up a part of a "PMN-2" which was covered in soil. He knocked it against a 
stone to remove the soil and it exploded. 
The Sub-Commander said the victim was working improperly because he should have been 
controlling his partner. 
The Section Leader stated the victim was negligent. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim ignored safety precautions by playing with the 
fuse and that the absence of the Section Leader was a contributory factor. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that Section Leaders should not be assigned to cover for 
deminers in breaching parties, that the command group must stress the danger of touching 
UXO/devices, and that the Section Leader should be disciplined for his poor performance. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 166 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 












The accident report listed the victim's injuries as amputation of five fingers of his left hand, 
"superficial" injuries to his right hand, face and nose, and foreign bodies to both eyes.   
A medic's sketch (reproduced below) showed left hand and facial injury. 
 
A photograph showed that all fingers on the victim's left hand had been traumatically 
amputated and the palm opened [like a rose]. A later photograph (after dressing) showed that 
the body of the hand and the thumb were apparently still in place. The victim was looking at 
the camera and his eyes appear clear, so the eye injury is thought to have been minor. 
The insurers were informed on 6th March 1998 that the victim had lost all the fingers of his left 
hand and got foreign bodies in his eyes in an accident on 15th February 1998 [sic] when a 
fuse went off in his hand. [Dates were frequently mistranslated in Afghan reports.] 
No record of compensation was found in June 1998. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because (as the 
investigators found) the field supervisor was absent and the victim's error went uncorrected.  
It is possible that the device was left over from the inadequate destruction of a PMN-2 during 
routine clearance, as has happened in other accidents.  
The victim appears to have been unaware of the danger of handling parts of a PMN-2, which 
implies inadequate training. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
Gathering of medical treatment and compensation details was prevented by the UN 
programme manager who denied all access to records in September 1999. Access has 
continued to be denied up to the date of completion of this version of the database. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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